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TRACT FOR THE TIMES:

THE MAINE LAW RIGHT.

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THE MAINE LAW RIGHT.

By the Maine Law is meant any law which pronounces the sale of intoxicating drinks, as a beverage, a crime to be punished, and the article itself an outlaw, to be sought out and destroyed.

I. The enactment and enforcement of such a law comes within the legitimate designs and sphere of civil government, for which it is ordained. If this proposition can be sustained, a good foundation will be laid.

1. There is no valid reason in law, equity or morals, why government may not enact such a law. If it be said that such a law would be unconstitutional, the reply is two-fold :

First, if it were a fact that such a law would be unconstitutional, the reply is, let the constitution be altered so as to remove this objection out of the way. The constitution makes provision for its amendment, and hence, if, as the objection supposes, the obstacle in the way of a prohibitory law, is found in the constitution, nothing can be plainer than that government has power to remove that obstacle out of the way, and hence, government must have power to pass the law in question.

Secondly, it is demanded what part of the constitution would be violated by such a law? This has never been shown. Let those who talk about the constitution, give the chapter and verse on which they found their objection, and they shall receive attention.

But it is too late in the day to raise this question, for the courts have already settled the principle involved, over and over again; and the principle of the law has been sustained, and will always be sustained by intelligent and honest courts, whenever it is brought before them in the form of a duly enacted statute law.

It is objected that such a law would be a violation of personal rights! It is demanded what rights would be violated by such a law? No right but the right to sell rum! And pray what right has any man to sell rum? No man would have a legal right to sell rum, when the law should forbid it; no legal right would therefore be violated by a prohibitory law. And no man ever had a moral right to sell rum, nor is it possible that such a moral right exist, therefore no moral right would be violated by such a law. Now, as all rights are such by law or morals, it follows that no right would be violated by a law that should prohibit the sale of rum.

2. Laws already exist which involve the principle that would be involved in a law that should prohibit the sale of intoxicating drinks. The present license law involves, to all intents and purposes, the right to pass a prohibitory law. Though, in its operation, essentially a protective law, yet it protects in a manner which involves the right to prohibit. The license law protects a few persons by ordaining that no others shall sell intoxicating drinks. Government then exercises the right of prohibiting ninety-nine out of a hundred of all the

people the business of selling rum ; and if they have this right, they must have the right of prohibiting one more on each hundred, which would be the very thing for which I contend. But what must settle this question beyond dispute, is the fact that the few that are permitted to sell intoxicating drinks, are dependent for their right so to do upon government. They must buy the right to sell rum of government, and pay their money for it. This every man does who takes a license. Now, as government sells the right to vend intoxicating drinks, it shows that the right of vending is in the hands of government, and not in the hands of the people individually ; otherwise government sells what is not its own. If, then, the right to vend intoxicating drinks belong to the government, to grant or withhold, it follows conclusively that government has power to pass a prohibitory law. The very fact that no man has a right to sell without obtaining a license from government, proves that government has the right to prohibit the sale thereof.

There are other laws which involve the same principle. Such is the law regulating poison, the law prohibiting the sale of damaged meat, the law respecting exhibitions, theatres, &c., of which I will not speak in detail. These laws all involve the same principle that would be involved in a law prohibiting the sale of intoxicating drinks, and if it be decided that government has not the power to pass such a law, such decision must sweep all these other laws by the board.

If it be said that the objection to the Maine Law is that, by proposing to seize and destroy intoxicating drinks, it proposes to seize and destroy private property. The reply is as follows : the liquor, after such law shall be enacted, will not be property in any just sense of that term. It

will not be property in the eye of the civil law, for the law itself will pronounce the having and holding it under the circumstances an unlawful act. The law will ordain that no man shall have and hold property in such articles under such circumstances, and the articles shall not be deemed adjudged and held to be the property of those in whose hands they are found. It is clear, then, that it will not be property after the enactment of the Maine Law, so far as civil law is to prevail in determining what is property.

On the other hand, it will not be property in a moral aspect of the subject; for no man can have a right to hold property in and keep what is injurious to the community and ruins his neighbor.

The ease is just this: the article under the operation of such a law would be contraband and forfeited, and laws already exist which cover the entire principle. Smuggled goods are seized by government, and yet they are as much the property of the smuggler as would be intoxicating liquor under such a law. If a person were detected in running salt from this goodly city, Syracuse, which had not been inspected and paid the government tax, the salt would not only be forfeited, but his horses and wagon also; and yet they would be his private property as much as the intoxicating drinks would be private property under the Maine Law.

The implements of counterfeiters and burglars are seized and destroyed, and yet they are as much the private property of the miscreants as would be intoxicating drinks under the operation of the Maine Law.

But it requires a stronger figure, a more striking illustration, to do justice to the liquor traffic. Suppose a person to be engaged in importing and breeding deadly serpents. He buys them in a

foreign country and he raises them at home, and while they are kept perfectly confined in the cage no harm is done, but every now and then one gets out of the cage and bites a citizen and he dies. The bite is always injurious ; some die immediately, others linger for a time and then die. Some gradually waste away, grow pale and thin, and finally die ; others swell up and grow red in the face and their eyes are bloodshot, and in this disfigured manner they linger for a few years and die. It impairs the moral sensibilities of all who are bitten ; it also impairs their intellects ; some are rendered nearly or quite idiots ; others are rendered mad and become furious and dangerous, and in their paroxysms will cut and abuse and dash themselves to pieces, like the man that dwelt among the tombs, whom no one could tame ; others dash upon their best friends with the fury of demons, and maltreat or murder their fathers or mothers, their wives or their children.

To carry out this illustration, suppose this importer and breeder of these serpents vends them in cases to others, and there are persons in every city and town and neighborhood, who keep a few of these serpents, who also sell them out single to such as will purchase, and with all these, every now and then, one is bitten, and that in every neighborhood where these serpents are kept, numbers of the inhabitants show visible marks of having been bitten. Suppose this traffic to go on until its cost is more than sixty millions of dollars per annum, the number of bitten in the nation is more than three hundred and seventy thousand persons, and that more than forty thousand persons die of their bites every year, in addition to which there is an immense amount of property destroyed by them in their paroxysms of fury, and a vast amount of anguish and suffering is inflicted

upon innocent victims. Suppose, once more, that there is no way to prevent all this evil but to prevent the further importing and breeding of these serpents, and would it be considered an unconstitutional and severe law that should enact that no more serpents should be imported, bred or vended, and that after a given date all found in the land shall be seized and destroyed? Such is the liquor traffic, and such is the Maine Law.

3. To deny that government has power to pass such a law as that for which we contend, would be to subvert civil government, by removing from its reach every object which it is designed to secure. What is the design of government? or by what rules are we to determine the rights and powers of government? When these questions are answered, it must appear plain, that if government cannot rightfully enact the law in question, all enactments must be nullity, and government can hold no rightful existence.

• By what rule, then, are we to determine what government may do, and what it may not do? If we infer the power of government from the general design of the institution, it must follow that the right and power is equal to the accomplishment of the design. What, then, is the design of government from which we are to infer its rights and powers?

Is it to suppress vice and immorality? Then must government *have power* to suppress vice and immorality, and that involves the right to suppress rum selling, which is the cause of more vice than all other causes put together.

Is it the design of government to suppress crime? It is clear that there can be no more effectual measure to accomplish this design than to suppress the sale of intoxicating drinks.

Is government designed to protect the weak

against the strong? No class need that protection more than the drunkard, his abused wife, and hungry and half-naked children—they need the strong arm of the law to protect them against the ravages of the rum seller.

Is government designed to render men secure in their persons and property? It is known to all that neither are nor can be secure where men are allowed to vend and drink alcohol without restraint.

Is government designed to promote the general welfare? No one can deny that the suppression of the sale of intoxicating drinks would do more to promote such general welfare than any other one measure government could adopt. It is clear, then, that if the rights and powers of government are to be inferred from the general design of the institution, government must have power to suppress the sale of intoxicating drinks.

But it may be said that the rights and powers of government are not to be inferred from the individual rights of the people. Those who take this ground, must admit that government has a right to do just what the people would have a right to do, were they assembled *en masse* to make rules for themselves. Now, nothing can be more plain than that it is the individual right of every person to refuse to sell, buy or drink rum; and if the right of government is inferred from the rights of the people, government must have the right, standing in the place of each and all the people, to determine for them that they shall neither vend nor drink rum. To deny this, would be to deny that the rights of government may be inferred from the individual rights of the people.

Do we infer the powers of government from the principles of righteousness as taught in the Bible? Then must government have power to carry out

and enforce those principles. And when we look into this book of books, we find that it forbids all drunkenness, and all incentives to drunkenness, and all selling or giving away of intoxicating drink. Hab. ii. 15 : "Wo unto him that giveth his neighbor drink, that putteth his bottle to him."

If, then, the Bible is to be the standard, it will sweep this unholy traffic from the land and the world. If government has not power to pass such a prohibitory law on this subject, it must be incapable of passing such laws on other subjects, and government itself must become a nullity. With these considerations I will leave this part of the subject, trusting that I have shown to the satisfaction of the candid that it comes perfectly within the scope and power of civil government to prohibit by law the sale of everything which is hurtful to the community, including intoxicating drinks among the evils to be prohibited.

II. It is necessary to resort to prohibitory law to consummate the temperance reformation.

1. To license the sale of intoxicating drinks tends to produce intemperance, as every reflecting mind must see. We shall not, in this place, attempt to prove that moderate drinking is injurious, as we might do, but only that it leads to intemperate drinking. So long as the habit of drinking is continued, the habit of drunkenness cannot be broken up. This is a point so well established, that it is unnecessary to waste time to prove it again. If there were no moderate drinkers, there would soon be no drunkards ; hence, the success of the temperance cause depends upon our success in persuading men to wholly abandon the use of intoxicating drinks. The question, then, is this, and it is a plain one.—Does the act of licensing men to sell the evil spirit to be drunk, help or hinder us in the work of persuading our neighbors

not to drink it ? It cannot be denied that the act of licensing the sale of intoxicating drink is a decided and public testimony in favor of drinking it, and every man who in any way aids in giving license, and all who approve of the license system, declare to the world their acts and principles, that it is right to drink intoxicating liquor, and that it ought to be drunk. If it be right to license a man to sell spirit, it must follow that it is right for such person to sell it ; and if it be right for one man to sell spirit to be drunk, it must also follow that it is right for others to buy and drink spirit, for no man can have a right to sell to be drunk, what another has not a right to buy and drink.

The above view shows that the system of granting licenses to men to sell intoxicating drinks, is worse than to have no law on the subject, so far as moral influence is concerned. If there was no law, there would be no testimony on the subject, but the license law is a testimony speaking in the voice of the State, declaring through her statute books, that in the opinion of the people of this Commonwealth, intoxicating liquors ought to be sold and drunk.

But the license system not only exerts the influence of moral suasion in favor of the use of intoxicating drinks, but it has the effect of a protective law. The law professedly grants licenses for the public good, hence it presumes that it is necessary that there should be some portion of our citizens engaged in the business of selling intoxicating drinks ; and to secure this object, the law prohibits all but a certain number of licensed individuals to sell, to encourage them in it by making it profitable. The law does not restrict the *quantity* to be sold, but the *number of persons* by whom it is to be sold. If, then, a man can make it profitable to sell spirit in a community where

every one has the right of selling, he can make it much more profitable where the business is restricted by law to a very few individuals in each town. It is clear from these views, that the present license law tends to protect and encourage the sale of intoxicating drinks, and must therefore promote intemperance.

2. Moral suasion, without the aid of prohibitory law, is not sufficient to restrain all men from vice. There are various reasons why it is so—two of the principal of which we will notice.

First, All men are not sufficiently enlightened to see and feel the force of moral principle, and therefore, cannot be controlled by moral suasion.

Secondly, All men are not honest, and therefore disregard the voice of moral principle, and resist the influence of moral suasion. Taking the world as we find it, these two considerations show, most clearly, the necessity of prohibitory law to restrain men from vice. But it is often objected to this view, that nothing is gained, in a moral point of light, by restraining men from vice by the force of law, inasmuch as it does not reform the disposition of the heart. To this it may be replied, that three important advantages may be gained by prohibitory law, admitting that it has no direct tendency to make the heart better.

First, it may prevent the formation of inveterate habits of vice, and the individual be thus kept within the influence of moral suasion.

Secondly, it will prevent all the individual and personal evils which would follow the commission of crimes thus restrained by law.

Thirdly, the influence of the bad example is prevented, when men are restrained from vice by the force of law.

I trust I have now shown, first, that the sale of intoxicating drink is a public evil, and second,

that moral suasion will not restrain it ; we are, therefore left to choose between resorting to law on this subject, or abandoning law on all other subjects. In no other way can we avoid the most glaring inconsistency.

Why not suppress horse-stealing by moral suasion, as well as to suppress rum-selling by the same process. It must appear easier to suppress horse stealing by the force of public opinion, than rum-selling. Horse-stealing cannot look back to the time when it could plead the sanction of law, but rum-selling will always be able to do this. Horse-stealing cannot name the time when it was reputable with the community generally, when the different churches had horse-stealing members and deacons and ministers, but rum-selling will always be able to do this. No one can hope to make rum-selling more disreputable than horse-stealing, and yet moral suasion is not sufficient to suppress horse-stealing without the aid of law ; yea, moral suasion and law combined cannot wholly suppress it ; how vain then, to think of suppressing rum-selling without law.

Why not suppress false-swearing, slander, profane swearing, and Sabbath-breaking, by moral suasion without law ? Why punish the crime by law, and at the same time legalize the cause that produces the crime ! Drunkenness is prohibited by law in this Commonwealth ; why not then prohibit the sale of intoxicating drinks, which certainly leads to the crime of drunkenness ? Moral suasion can never be arrayed against rum-selling with a more united and powerful influence than it has been against the other vices above named ; the civil law has proclaimed its penalty from our seats of justice ; every pulpit in the land has thundered and lightened with the law of God against stealing, lying, profane swearing, &c., and yet these

evils have not been put down ; it must therefore be a hopeless case to think of preventing the sale of intoxicating drinks by moral suasion, in view of the strong hold which it has upon the community, the many advocates it finds, and the countenance of the civil law. In conclusion, the experience of the world proves that moral suasion will not restrain all men from vice. It failed to do it amid the hallowed bowers of Eden ; it failed to do it on the day when the earth received the blood of righteous Abel, at the hand of the first murderer ; it was not sufficient in the days of Noah's ministry, while the waters were gathering to drown the old world ; it failed on the day when Abraham prayed for devoted Sodom, as the clouds of God's wrath were gathering, surcharged with fire ; it was not sufficient at Sinai's base, while God rested in a cloud upon the summit, blazing with lightning and uttering his command in the thunder's voice, "Thou shalt do no sin ;" moral suasion was not equal to the reformation of all men, under the unearthly and soul subduing eloquence of the son of God. If then prohibitory law is necessary to complete the temperance reformation, we will attempt to show ;

III. We are to show that government is bound by the highest moral obligation to enact and enforce a prohibitory law in relation to the sale of intoxicating drinks.

1. The simple right of government involves the obligation to do it. To make out a moral obligation to perform any act, two things must be proved.

First, It must be shown that the proposed act is right in itself, and that it ought to be done. This is most obviously the case in relation to the subject in question. Nothing can be more plain, than that the vending of intoxicating drinks ought

to be stopped. The whole preceding argument goes to show this.

Secondly, To make out a moral obligation, it must be shown that the person or party appealed to is authorized to perform such acts.

Suppose it to be right to hang a man for murder, it will not follow that we have a right to hang the murderer wherever we can find him, for we are not authorized to perform the work of hanging. Now in the case before us, government is the party authorized to perform the act, and therefore, upon government must the obligation rest.

The argument stands thus :

The sale of intoxicating drinks ought to be prevented ;

But government alone has power to prevent it.

Therefore, government must be morally bound to prevent the sale of intoxicating drinks.

2. The design of God, in the establishment of civil authorities, proves the point in question. My text says, "Rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil. Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same: For he is the minister of God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the sword in vain; for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil."

This most clearly shows, that the design of the establishment of rulers is, to protect and support virtue, and to punish and suppress vice, and the obligation to suppress vice most clearly involves the obligation to suppress the sale of intoxicating drinks. To put it in the form of a regular argument, I say,

It is the duty of government to suppress vice.

The vending of intoxicating drinks is the source of more vice than any other one cause ;

Therefore, it is the duty of government to suppress the vending of intoxicating drinks.

3. The individual responsibility of those who administer government, involves the duty in question.

Every man is bound to do all that he can, that is right and lawful, to suppress intemperance, and when a man is clothed with governmental power, it only enlarges his *power* to do, without diminishing his *obligation* to do ; he is still as much bound to do all he can as he was while a private citizen, possessing an enlarged capacity to do.

When men are elected to make laws for the people, they are not released from their individual obligations. A man bound to do all he can at home in his individual capacity to suppress intemperance, is no less bound to do all he can when in the legislative hall. Men are not all called to act in the same sphere, and hence when it is said that men are bound to do what they can for the suppression of intemperance, it is implied that it relates to the sphere in which each is called to act. It is a broad principle, which no man can deny, that every man is bound to do all that he can to suppress intemperance. Now, if I am bound to do all I can as minister, because that it is the sphere in which I act, and another is bound to do all he can as a physician, because that is his sphere of action, then it must follow that a legislator is bound to do all he can in law making, because that is the sphere in which he acts ; it is therefore plain that government is under a moral obligation to suppress the sale of intoxicating drinks by law.

There is another way in which the moral obligation of government may be proved from the in-

dividual obligations of the people. Government is bound to do just what the people would be bound to do, were they assembled en masse to make their own laws. If then the sale of intoxicating drinks ought to be suppressed, it follows that the people would be bound to suppress it, were they assembled to make rules for the government of the whole ; therefore, as the government is bound to carry out the obligations of the people, government must be bound to suppress the sale of intoxicating drinks.

It may be well here to correct a common mistake, which is this : many seem to suppose that government is bound to carry out the will of a majority of the people. This is not true, especially when we speak of moral obligation. Government is not bound to do what the people *would do*, were they assembled en masse, but government is under obligation to do what the people would be *bound to do*, were they assembled. Legislatures are not bound by the will of a majority of their constituents, but by the law of right. They can not be bound by the will of the people, when that will is morally wrong. The people can have no right to entertain or express a will that is morally wrong ; and surely, government cannot be bound by a will which the people have no right to entertain or express. Indeed, legislators themselves become transgressors, when they obey the wrong will of their constituents. Suppose the whole people join in requiring their representatives to pass and give the official sanction to a law that is morally wrong, has government a right to comply with the requisition ? No more than individual, or a number of individuals have a right to commit sin for hire. Government is not only *not* bound by the wrong will of the people, but it is

bound by the allegiance due the throne of God, to resist every such wrong will, even at the sacrifice of life. Better aspire to a martyr's crown, than to set their seal to a law that is morally wrong, though the whole array of fallen spirits in this world should rise up to require it at their hands.

We will now close this argument by stating it thus :

Every person is bound to do all that is right to suppress intemperance ;

It is right for those who are clothed with governmental powers to suppress intemperance by a prohibitory law ;

Therefore, government must be bound to enact and enforce a prohibitory law for the suppression of intemperance.

4. The express declarations of God's Word involve the obligation in question. We will not enlarge upon this argument, but will only quote one text as a specimen of many of a similar character which might be adduced.

Jer. xxi. 12. "O house of David, thus saith the Lord, Execute judgment in the morning, and deliver him that is spoiled out of the hand of the oppressor, lest my fury go out like fire, and burn that none can quench it, because of the evil of your doings."

There are two points in relation to this text worthy of particular attention, viz., the persons addressed and the work they are required to do. The text was addressed to the house of David, which was in other words, the government of the nation. So far, therefore, as the text has an application now, it is applicable to civil government ; nor does it alter the nature of the obligation, whether the power to govern be in the hands of

a king, a president, or an elective legislature, or in a government of a mixed character. What then, is the work which this text requires government to do? It is to "execute judgment and deliver the spoiled out of the hand of the oppressor." Who, then, is spoiled but the drunkard, who are the oppressed and ruined but the outraged wife and worse than fatherless children? And who is the oppressor but the rum-seller? And how can government deliver the spoiled out of the hand of this oppressor in any way so proper and effectual, as to pass a prohibitory law, which shall put a stop to his unholy and ruinous business?

CONCLUSION.

1. An awful responsibility rests on this nation, and upon the individual States of this nation. Instead of supressing this great evil, government has employed its influence and power to protect it. We import by law, we manufacture, and we licence the cause of all sorts of crime, misery and death. Now when we consider that this whole business is legislation against God, and by a nation too, with their Bibles in their hands, what a cloud of guilt must rest upon the nation, and what a storm of righteous yet fearful retribution must be gathering in the chambers where Jehovah treasures up his wrath and his thnnder against the day of vengence? So long as government tolerates the traffic in intoxicating drinks, so long must the nation, and each State, pursuing the same policy, be responsible for the fearful consequences which flow from it, and the amount of guilt can be measured only by the number and enormity of the crimes, and the weight of wo produced. Intellects enough have been blighted and turned into night to have eclipsed any other

age but this, and wrapped the world in darkness. Nerves and muscles enough have been enervated to have rendered puerile and helpless any other age but this one of wonderful enterprise and inventions. Property enough has been wasted to have banished hunger from the world, and to have supplied garments for all the naked and destitute of the human race.

Consider the tears that have been shed, the sighs that have been uttered, the groans that have responded to groans, the hearts that have been broken, and the spirits that have been ruined ; consider no more than woman's misery and orphan's tears, and how fearful must be the responsibility ?

2. This responsibility, under our free system of government, rolls back upon the people, and they have got to bear it in their individual capacity. The people have it in their power to correct these evils, to repeal every law which gives any countenance to the deadly traffic, and to enact and sustain other laws, such as the crime demands ; laws that should impose a withering penalty upon the business of poisoning men with alcohol. If then the people have it in their power to correct these evils, upon them must the responsibility rest.

But I am aware that men are not apt to feel, as individuals, the responsibility that belongs to the whole. Feel it or not feel it, it is theirs, and they will find it out in the day of retribution, if not before. That responsibility which rests upon the whole, rests upon each, for the responsibility of the whole is made up of the responsibility of each individual, therefore, each individual must bear this fearful amount of responsibility upon his own shoulders. Suppose the lawful punishment of a crime to be ten years' imprisonment ; suppose that crime to be committed by ten persons jointly,

where does the responsibility and the guilt lie? How will you punish the offence. Will you imprison one of them ten years to satisfy the law, and let the other nine escape! or will you inflict one-tenth part of the punishment upon each, keeping each in prison one year, making up the ten years required by law between them; or will you imprison each and all of them for the whole offence, making each responsible for the whole crime! I answer, you will do the latter. The fact that many combined together to commit a crime does not lessen the responsibility and guilt of each. So with the consequences of rum-selling. The whole people who countenance the traffic are responsible for all its consequences, and this responsibility falls with all its weight upon each individual of the whole, as though he had to bear it alone. How fearful then is the responsibility of those, who lend their influence in any way to sustain a practice so fraught with crime, misery, anguish and death.

3. How fearful is the responsibility of the vender of intoxicating drinks. The vender is no less guilty than he would be if there were no law in his favor. The license law confers no moral right; the law itself is morally wrong, and that which is morally wrong cannot form the basis of moral right. Civil law does not make anything morally right—it is not the design of law to create right, but to secure what is previously right, and right is not founded upon law, but law should be founded upon right. The vender, therefore, is just as guilty as though there were no law on the subject. The law is wrong, and no man can have a right to avail himself of a wrong law to injure his fellow-beings; no, nor to benefit himself. Did the law even require a man to vend intoxicating

drinks, he would have no right to obey that law, but would be bound to disobey it.

Go to the Bible, and you will learn from Daniel, from Shadrac, Meshac, and Abednego, from Paul and Silas, Peter and John, that God is to be obeyed rather than man. Invoke counsel of the souls of the martyrs whose spirits made their exit from gloomy cells through iron grates on the wings of an expiring breath to a martyr's reward, and you shall learn from thence that no human authority can justify the infraction of moral principle.

We ask the vender, then, "By what authority doest thou these things, and who gave thee this authority?" Do they say they have a license? This may be, but that license confers no moral right—it is just such a license as no one can have a right to give—a license to do wrong. It is a license to destroy men—a license to rob the innocent—a license to make widows and orphans—a license to convert the hunger of the drunkard's family into plenty to put upon their own tables—a license to convert the rags of the half clad children into silk and lace to put upon their wives and daughters—a license to convert the tears of the drunkard's abused and neglected wife, into gold to put into their coffers or jingle in their pockets!

But will this license be an excuse in the day of retribution, when God shall make inquisition for blood? When the rum-seller shall stand at the bar of his Judge, and those whom he has destroyed shall stand around him; drunkards howling in his ears the reproaches of their own ruin, and their wives and children, loaded with all the fruit of his unholy traffic, pouring upon him the scalding, withering tale of their miseries; will he then look

his Judge in the face and say, I had a license to do these things?

Let it be said finally, that when the dreams of worldly interest shall have faded from the disordered imagination—when the lamp of life shall burn dim and hasten to expire amid the breaking in of light from the spirit world, and when eternity shall roll up its long concealed orb of abiding realities, and exhibit at one view the final and full results of this dreadful traffic, then will all wish there had been enacted and enforced a Maine Law.

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